Constructivism has a problem in accounting for agent-led change and for what motivates agents to make up their minds about how to put their agency to use. I show that constructivismÕs problem of change is related to tensions between constructivism's own key assumptions about the mutually constitutive relationship between structure and agency, understanding of change and to an essentialist conception of identity. I argue that agency is constituted through processes of ÔidentificationÕ involving identity and narrative constructions and performance through practice and action. I make the perhaps controversial move to regard ontological security as a precondition for agent-led change and to identify ontological security maximisation as functionally equivalent to rationalist theoriesÕ agent assumption of utility maximisation. I identify two strategies for maximising ontological security; a Ôstrategy of beingÕ to secure a stable and esteem-enhancing identity and a strong narrative; and a Ôstrategy of doingÕ to ensure cognitive consistency through routinised practice whilst also undertaking action contributing to a sense of integrity and pride. The article concludes that although humans are endowed with agency, their actual ability to utilise their agency is severely constrained by their need for maintaining ontological security, which may explain why change appears so difficult to achieve.
The Problem of Change in Constructivist Theory

Ontological Security Seeking and Agent Motivation
One of the fundamental questions in International Relations is how to change the world into a better place. Yet, despite the normative aspirations to change dysfunctional, and often violent, practices, the IR discipline developed a widespread understanding that Ôthe internationalÕ was characterized by continuity and recurring patterns, and that the aspiration for making a better world, was an idealistic Ð even a utopian Ð project. The belief that change was unattainable became so ingrained in the discipline that when the Cold War ended, most had not even considered the possibility that such a change could take place 1 and some even questioned its theoretical relevance 2 . Moreover, change was seen as one of those intellectual nettles that would be better left alone 3 rather than as something that could be theorized, categorized and conceptualized or indeed used prescriptively 4 . Therefore when constructivism entered the discipline proclaiming that Ôthe world is of our makingÕ 5 and that Ôanarchy is what states make of itÕ 6 , it not only opened up a completely new research agenda focused on change and agency, but it also returned the discipline to its original normative aspiration to be able to prescribe how to make change happen.
The new constructivist research agenda soon produced a voluminous literature enquiring into change.
Emanuel Adler underlined the importance of change for constructivist research by suggesting that Ôif constructivism is about anything, it is about changeÕ 7 . Change has been central to all constructivist theorizing because of the fundamental premise that change is possible through the mutually constitutive relationship between structure and agency and the belief that the constancy of structure may be mitigated through agent practice, whilst agentsÕ identity and behaviour occasionally could be altered following structural change or through social processes of interaction 8 . Moreover with the constructivist insistence that structure is not just material but is ideas (nearly) all the way down 9 , relevant change was no longer just material structural change, but any kind of change that occurred when agents, through their performance altered the rules and norms that were constitutive of international interaction and in the process changed identities and hence interest 10 implication of constructivist theory was that if the world really is Ôwhat we make of itÕ, ÔweÕ, as individuals endowed with agency, can also Ôun-makeÕ recurrent dysfunctional practices. However, although there can be no doubt that constructivism has brought the discipline closer to understanding change, the promise of constructivist theory as an avenue for understanding change, and for prescribing how to achieve change, has arguably not been fully realized as constructivism seemed to develop a de facto focus on structure and stability rather than on agents and change.
The article starts from the constructivist premise that agent-led change is possible albeit difficult. I
argue that the problem of change in constructivist theory is rooted in tensions and contradictions within and between constructivismÕs own key assumptions, especially in the constructivist ontology of a social world consisting of structure and agency, in constructivismÕs essentialist conception of identity and in constructivismÕs incomplete conceptualization of change. Jeffrey Checkel has labeled the problem of change in constructivist theorizing as ÔcodeterminationÕ 11 in which key concepts are seen simultaneously as sources of stability and sources of change, yet without it being clear what motivates agents to switch from one to the other 12 . The puzzle is that constructivist research identified norms, rules, identity, and practice as both elements of stability and as essential for bringing about change, yet also linked assumed human desires for stability and predictability to the same concepts 13 . This article is essentially an attempt to resolve the problem of codetermination in constructivist theory with the ambition to be able to more fully understand why intended agent-led change often falters and how to better achieve the goal of making change happen. The logical solution to the codetermination problem might be to scale down the constructivist reliance on social psychology, which arguably has led to the (implicit) emphasis on continuity by focusing on the human need for cognitive stability and predictability. However, rather than taking flight from the reliance on social psychology as a way to understand human motivation, I prefer the approach championed by Ned Lebow who suggests that a more multidimensional and nuanced understanding of human motives to include appetite, spirit and reason is the way forward
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. I therefore remain committed to an explicitly psychological form of constructivism 15 centered on the self-constitution of agency through processes of identification and the suggestion that ontological security is a key concept for overcoming the Ôcodetermination problemÕ.
The article proceeds in four main sections, starting out by locating ontological security as essential for the self-constitutive identification processes that are taking place at the agent level and as a decisive factor when agents decide to put their agency to use to undertake change-making action. I draw on the growing literature on ontological security to show that the search for ontological security is a primary motivational factor in all identification processes and a pre-condition for agents to use their agency strategically. In the second section I look more closely at the roots of the codetermination problem by focusing on constructivismÕs conception of the social world, identity and change, drawing on authors third section the article moves inside the agent level to focus on agent-level identification processes and how the constitution of agency is an ongoing and always unfinished project arising from the Ôexperience of beingÕ, expressed through identity and narrative construction processes, and from the Ôexperience of doingÕ demonstrated through practice and action 19 and with deep implications for the ongoing identity and narrative construction processes. Finally in the fourth section the article brings the strands together to present a constructivist framework for understanding agent-led change through ontological-security maximization, suggesting that all agents engage in time consuming ontological security-seeking strategies, and that only when a sufficient level of ontological security has been achieved are agents able and/or willing to undertake the kind of action that might lead to change.
Ontological Security
At its most basic level ontological security is Ôthe security of the selfÕ
20
. Since the introduction of ontological security to International Relations theory, a significant literature has emerged. In Critical Security Studies, the link between ontological security and physical security has been investigated to understand how securitized issues can be brought back to the realm of normal politics 42 Ð or how to Ôun-makeÕ dysfunctional practices Ð by differentiating between Ôsecurity as beingÕ and Ôsecurity as survivalÕ. The interesting finding is that desecuritization need not take place through a social relationship with an ÔOtherÕ, but can also be achieved through self-constitutive identification . Therefore rather than just focusing on how identity is constituted in relations with others, the possibility of selfconstitutive processes based on reflexivity of past experience and evolving knowledge structures emerges. As a result, being ontologically secure does not mean having a stable identity, but rather that the ÔselfÕ is constantly re-constituted and regrounded on the basis of changing knowledge structures that are captured in narratives and incorporated into identification processes. security is always a fragile and contingent condition which is constantly in danger of being destabilized by Ôdislocatory eventsÕ or of being undermined by behavior that is evaluated negatively by the external environment or by the individual/entity.
Although ontological security as a concept initially was developed for understanding how individuals with severe psychological issues might experience their own existence and the limitations a lack of ontological security would place on their ability to function in the wider society, the concept holds considerable potential for understanding how agents are able to utilize their agency, and perhaps more importantly, how a lack of ontological security might severely limit the ability of agents to fully exercise their agency in a strategic way. In the following I draw on the literature on ontological security outlined here, to in the first instance return to the problem of codetermination in constructivist theory and then to outline a constructivist framework in which the continuous ÔregroundingÕ of ontological security appears to be central for understanding how (and when) agents are able to utilize their agency strategically to bring about change.
Revisiting the social world, change and identity
The problem of codetermination arises from the simultaneous belief that on the one hand change is possible through agent practice and changing ideational structures (such as norms), and on the other hand that the very same practices and norms have structural characteristics through their resilience derived from agents being hardwired to prefer the stability and cognitive consistency they provide 54 .
This raises the question of how the impetus for change arises in the first place. In other words, if agents reproduce their own structural constraints though the very same quotidian practices and norms that are assumed to bring about change 55 and they instinctively prefer stability to change, how does change ever take place? To move towards an answer to this question it is necessary to revisit constructivismÕs foundational assumption about the social world as a duality of structure and agency, which leads to a problematization of constructivismÕs understanding of external and internal sources of change.
The ontology of the social world
The constructivist conceptualization of the social world as consisting only of structure and agency, is a problem for understanding change because the possibility of change is restricted to structures changing through agent practice or agentÕs practice changing through structural shifts. I am persuaded by Hidemi
Suganami that the constructivist reliance on the structure-agency dichotomy represents an incomplete understanding of the social world and that a more all-encompassing understanding of the social world is one that focuses on a trinity comprising of those elements of life that can be changed, those that canÕt and those that just happen by chance. Therefore rather than seeing the social world as consisting of just structure and agency, I follow Suganami (and strangely Singer) in understanding the social world as consisting of elements that can be described as Ôvoluntaristic, deterministic and stochasticÕ 180. 56 Singer quoted in Suganami, (1999), pp. 369 structure and agency are mutually constituted, 57 because it suggests that the mutual constitutiveness between agency and structure is only part of a wider process that also includes important selfconstitutive processes located inside the agent level, which are aditionally, as suggested by constructivism, influenced by structural (deterministic) factors but which are also influenced by other random (stochastic) factors that like the deterministic factors are located outside the agent level. By including other external (to the agent) factors than just structure, the well recognized influence from the occurrence of events, from social processes with other agents and from unintended consequences from agentsÕ own actions move into theoretical view as additional external sources of change. Moreover by opening up the agent level and looking inside the agent level, the reflexive (voluntaristic) agent based identification processes that are recognized in the literature on ontological security also move into theoretical view thereby providing a theoretical space for processes that were invisible (or bracketed) in early constructivist theory.
With SuganamiÕs conception of the social world, it follows that agents are not social and cultural
ÔdupesÕ blindly reacting to structural change or unthinkingly producing big change through endless minor modifications of their practice (although both of these also happen) but that agents (human beings) act with purpose and intention Ð sometimes to bring about change Ð but always to seek to maintain or establish their ontological security. In this article, I assume that agency is constituted through relational processes with externalities (structures, events and social relationships with other agents) and through internal sources of change found in the agentÕs self-constitutive identification processes, which involve significantly more self-reflection and self-constitution than is implied in most 57 Wendt (1999) constructivism. This assumption is expressed later in the article in figure three in the shaded ring, which represents external sources of change conceptualized as deterministic and stochastic sources of change which are placed around the voluntaristic processes, which represent internal sources of change originating inside the agent level.
Conceptualizing change and its external sources
I have already alluded to the constructivist focus on change and the belief that dysfunctional practices can be Ôun-madeÕ through changes in agentsÕ identity and/or in the ideational milieu such as in The other widely cited source of change in constructivist theorizing is change as the result of processes of socialization in which one set of agents (or a social group) seek to induce identity or norm change in another group of agents. There is an extensive constructivist literature on socialization in which it is argued that in times of cognitive dissonance agents will be particularly open to influence from other agents through various forms of social interaction such as argument and persuasion 63 , socialization 64 or simply by mimicking other agents 65 . The focus here is on how norms or other non-material forms of structure might be changed, which in turn might change identity and interests. Yet as pointed out by
Felix Berenskoetter 66 few early constructivists have offered substantial insights into identity and how it is formed, let alone how it informs action. Indeed Alexander Wendt 67 stated explicitly that his version of constructivism was not concerned with the formation of identity. In this sense therefore the emphasis on socialization as a means to change norms and identity is also curious because not only are processes of socialization, processes that take place in an agent-agent constitutive relationship rather than in a mutually constitutive relationship between structure and agency, but it is also unclear where in a social world conceived as a duality of structure and agency the motivations for some agents to seek to socialize other agents come from 68 . The main sources of change in constructivist theory Ð critical junctures and relational social processes such as socialization -leave constructivism with a problem of accounting for emergent factors originating neither at the structural level nor at the agent level.
Moreover, despite constructivismÕs rhetorical embrace of change, surprisingly little work has been undertaken on conceptualizing change and for understanding the many forms different forms change can take. Therefore in order to bring more depth and nuance to our thinking about change, it is instructive to look to the literature on Change Management.
With inspiration from Change Management theory, I use a two-pronged approach to inquire into the Ôform of changeÕ in terms of location, object and experience, and by distinguishing between different
Ôprocesses of changeÕ in terms of them being planned, emergent, evolutionary or revolutionary. Again it is instructive to look to Change Management where the necessity of theoretically accounting for ÔeventsÕ has long been recognized.
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On the one hand, change can be said to be continuous and ever present as agents and structures alike are always in a process of becoming. 74 In this understanding, change is a temporal entity inextricably tied to an imagined future of the self and a narrative about the journey towards the imagined endpoint of the process of becoming. This is the view of change that has been most prominent in constructivist The four possible change processes outlined here are of course ideal-types that are unlikely to be found in their pure form in actual change processes and clearly the three forms of change (outlined in figure   1 ) cannot easily be separated as I have done. In Ôreal lifeÕ the three forms of change are likely to be highly interconnected and mutually constitutive, where the different forms of change will continuously impact on the agentsÕ Ôexperience of beingÕ and Ôexperience of doingÕ, which will result in continuous processes of identity and narrative constructions and in adjustments to changes in the shared knowledge, all of which is contingent on (rare) changes at the structural level (deterministic factors) as well as the (more frequent) occurrence of events (stochastic factors). In Ôreal lifeÕ agents are faced with the challenge of having to navigate strategically in an emergent environment characterized by the continuous occurrence of events, unintended consequences of past action and the occasional crisis. The theoretical (and indeed practical) challenge therefore is to understand change as varied in both form and process and as something that places high demands on agentsÕ ability to reflect on their actions and use their agency strategically to bring about the desired change Ð preferably without detrimental consequences for agentsÕ self-esteem and standing. In practice this probably means that to make change happen, agents will be engaged in a continuous struggle to manage emergent change, unintended consequences and to occasionally be disrupted by crises that require the undertaking of transformational change Ð all of which will require regrounding of the agentsÕ ontological security. To understand these processes, it is necessary to move to the second consequence of the Suganamiinspired social ontology, which is to look for the sources of change located inside the agent level.
Identity and internal sources of change
Constructivists believe that change can be achieved through identity change because identity is linked to interests, which will influence behaviour. However, constructivists (at least conventional ones) also adhere to an essentialist view of identity, which logically means that identities are pre-constituted and fixed. Moreover by focusing on change as something that (almost) inevitably follows crisis and by emphasizing norms as something that comes part and parcel with a socio-culturally determined identity and appropriate behavior located in different pre-existing social groups, constructivists shied away from engaging in a deeper understanding of the reflexivity preceding norm and identity change and from understanding what other factors than cognitive dissonance might motivate agents to undertake changes in their identity and in their behaviour. This focus was perhaps understandable within the context of the early constructivist attempt to counter neorealism, but as suggested by Charlotte Epstein, it brought constructivism on a path that assumed the self to be fully formed prior to engagement with structure 79
. Constructivism effectively sought reconciliation between a structural, systemic focus that required positing given units and appraising them from the outside, while emphasizing effects that called into question the assumed given-ness and which required opening up the units. 80 As we saw 79 Epstein, (2011) One of the first approaches to try to understand the connection between identity, norms and behavior was to use social identity theory (SIT) for answering why agents associate themselves with certain identities and take on certain norm sets with specific behavioural expectations. Drawing on the literature from social psychology such as Henri Tajfel 83 and John Turner, 84 constructivists argued that agents strive to maximize their self-esteem 85 by gaining membership of highly ranked social groups. It was argued that membership of a social group would require agents to take on the identity of the social group and to behave in accordance with the groupÕs socially sanctioned norms. Agents would be willing to do so because belonging to a highly ranked social group would afford the individual esteem 86 and standing. 87 Moreover, from narrative theory 88 constructivists could point to how the identity of the individual and the social group continuously would be presented through on-going narrative constructions which would at all times seek to ensure positive emplotment and sense-making of the past by incorporating continuously occurring events into a narrative providing biographical continuity and supporting the identity of the social group. 89 The relationship between identity and narrative is widely acknowledged but has been specifically linked by Felix Despite the contributions from social identity theory and narrative theory, the implicit assumption about the essentialist self was not fully overcome because it simply moved the question from one assumed given identity to a choice between several available, but fully formed, identities. Moreover, the constructivist foundational idea of a dialectic between structure and agency has meant that constructivism has struggled to demonstrate how agency is constituted and why, once constituted, agents might sometimes use their agency to bring about change. The turn to practice within constructivist theory has moved constructivist research some way towards addressing this issue by recognizing practice as not just a mechanical form of routinized performance but also as constitutive of agency. In this view practice is not just a means for gradually changing structure as advocated in early constructivism but is actually constitutive of the agency that can undertake change. 91 As Theodor Schzatzki notes, practice is about Ôhow humans do their very being in the worldÕ 92 and how they organize human life, establish social order and transform the social orders they create. The Ôpractice turnÕ is an important point in the continuous development of constructivism towards overcoming some of the problems associated with ÔcodeterminationÕ because it challenges some of the assumptions about change made during the initial stages of constructivist thinking and it avoids many of the traditional dichotomies between stability and change, agency and structure as well as between ideas and matter.
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Even so practice theory does not fully account for the motivational issue of why agents sometimes make the strategic choice of seeking change by altering the established practices that they are said to value.
I agree with Epstein, Mitzen, 94 Steele 95 , Browning and Joeniemmi 96 and others that identity cannot be assumed to be pre-constituted, but that it is continuously constituted in processes of ÔidentificationÕ 97 in complex and interlinked processes of agentsÕ identity and narrative constructions and their performance through practice and action. The assumption of a mutually constitutive relationship between structure and agency severely limits the theoretical scope for accounting for self-constitutive processes at the agent level, and for other external stimuli than structural factors, and it therefore requires opening up the agent level for further scrutiny. However, even with opening up the agent level to look at the selfconstitutive identification processes taking place there, the assumption that agents prefer stability, leaves little room for self-constituted identity change. This is where the emerging literature on ontological security can offer insights into the micro-foundations of agentsÕ behavior and identity 93 Adler and Pouliot (2011) The framework developed in this article, rests to a large degree on the insights from social psychology and from the IR literature on ontological security.
Inside the agent-level -ontological security as motivation for utilizing agency
If the question is how and when agents make decisions to undertake action that can lead to change at any one of the three ÔlocationsÕ identified in figure 2, given that two out three forms of change are located at the agent level, our focus has to be the agent itself, how agency is constituted and the conditions necessary for agents to use their agency purposefully. I start from the rather simple premise that agency entails ÔbeingÕ and ÔdoingÕ implying a ÔselfÕ defined by an identity, articulated through a narrative and performed through practice and action, which is continuously re-grounded as a reflexive projectÕ that must be constantly worked at 99 .
The literature on ontological security suggests that ontologically secure individuals are individuals who although they may prefer a stable cognitive environment, have the ability to undertake change-making action when needed and who can cope with the change it induces and who are able to continuously incorporate change into their narrative and identity constructions. Moreover, based on the literature from social psychology 100 it seems reasonable to assume that all individuals develop a framework for maximizing their ontological security through their ÔbeingÕ in terms of identity and narrative and their ÔdoingÕ in terms of practice and action. Ontological security can therefore be assumed to significantly influence the ability (or willingness) of agents to exercise their agency by undertaking the kind of action that might lead to change. Moreover from the literature on ontological security it seems that the maximization of ontological security can be seen as an important motivational factor in the selfconstitutive processes taking place inside the agent level. From that I make the perhaps controversial move to regard ontological security maximization as functionally equivalent to rationalist theoriesÕ agent assumption of utility maximization and I build on social identity theoryÕs agent-level assumption of self-esteem maximization.
read as a downgrading of their importance, but is simply an acknowledgement of the great variety of stochastic and deterministic factors that are constantly bombarding agents and providing new input to the self-constitutive voluntaristic processes continuously taking place inside the shaded area. The many possibilities for stochastic and deterministic influences include (but is not limited to) critical junctures through gradual and sudden structural change, the constant occurrence of events Ð dislocatory ones as well as minor ones, intended and unintended consequences arising from agentÕs own actions as well as stimulus from social relations with other agents through for example socialization, persuasion or through learning from the behavior of others as well as material change in for example infrastructure or the natural environment.
Figure 3: Voluntaristic dentification processes inside the agent-level Change-making action will necessarily undermine cognitive stability by undoing the very practices that ensure cognitive stability, and it will require adjustments in agentsÕ identity and narratives. Logically therefore, change is always difficult to achieve because the agent action that is supposed to bring about change is difficult to sustain, as the inevitable disturbances in agentsÕ cognitive stability as well as changes in identity and narratives might lead to anxiety and hence a reduction in ontological security, which might result in paralysis rather than the ability to undertake action. This link may indeed explain the poor success rate observed in the field of Change Management in most change initiatives.
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Although change making action necessarily will undermine the aspect of ontological security that is associated with cognitive consistency, because individuals reflect and care deeply about their performance, action that is perceived to be successful can offer the prospect of strengthening ontological security by providing the individual with a sense of pride and a positive impact on selfesteem -or if action is perceived as unsuccessful Ð it can undermine ontological security. This is a crucial point because the connection between ontological security and action (represented in figure three by the arrow from ontological security to action) is only likely to be active when the level of ontological security is sufficient enough to afford agents the emotional capacity to undertake nonroutine action. Moreover, whether such action will be a one-off or whether it can be sustained over time depends on the perceived success of the action, as unsuccessful action will result in negative adjustments in identity and narrative constructions and in more time consuming processes of shuttling back and forth on the narrative-identity shuttle until ontological security can be re-established. This stands in contrast to situations where the action is deemed successful. In such a situation agents are likely to feel confident and enthusiastic about undertaking further change making action and thereby open up for the (rare) possibility of a sustainable change process.
Ontological security maximizing strategies
Given the vexatious nature of social reality caused especially by the continuous influence from stochastic and deterministic factors and the necessity of agents continually having to readjust their identity, narrative and practice in response to stochastic and deterministic influences, ontological security is a fragile and transient condition that must be endlessly re-constituted and reasserted. 103 In doing so, agents are constantly engaged in costly (in terms of attention) and time-consuming processes of seeking to maximize their ontological security. 104 I identify two strategies for maximizing ontological security; a Ôstrategy of beingÕ focused on the nexus between narrative and identity constructions and aiming to secure a stable and esteem-enhancing identity and biographical continuity through the construction of a Ôstrong narrativeÕ; and a Ôstrategy of doingÕ focused on the seemingly paradoxical relationship between practice and action to, on the one hand, uphold a stable cognitive environment through routinized practice whilst at the same time being able to undertake changeproducing action in reaction to stochastic and deterministic factors that can also contribute to maintaining a sense of individual integrity and pride. The two strategies are inter-linked and mutually constitutive and cannot be understood in isolation from each other Ð or in isolation from the constant influence of deterministic and stochastic factors. . These claims and their connection to the Ôstrategies of doingÕ are important because input into the narrative-identity nexus from the ÔactionÕ and ÔpracticeÕ elements in figure three will prompt changes in identity and/or narrative, giving rise to further rounds of shuttling back and forth on the Ônarrative shuttleÕ before the ÔupwardÕ move to ontological security is possible. In practical terms this means that the maintenance of ontological security over time is likely to be demanding and to involve costly and time-consuming processes that can appear to be Ônavel contemplatingÕ whilst agents Ôself-analyzeÕ and seek to formulate the necessary strong narrative. However, although practice and action are both intricately tied up with ontological security Ð this is so in different ways, which is why I, in contrast to most constructivist and practice theory, distinguish between the two.
Routine practices are likely to always have a mildly reinforcing effect on the narrative and identity construction processes and hence on ontological security by providing a stable, and largely taken-forgranted cognitive environment. Ontological security seeking will therefore involve routinization of practices as far as possible. But whereas routinized practices are likely to reinforce the important sense of order, stability and basic trust that is necessary for ontological security, it is unlikely to provide agents with any sense of pride or enhanced self-esteem, and practice certainly does not lead to change Although all four elements of the model Ð a stable and esteem-enhancing identity supported by a ÔstrongÕ narrative and reinforced through practice and action Ð are necessary for the maintenance (and re-establishment) of ontological security, the action element may only be actuated occasionally, as agents prefer the status quo sustained through practice to the change that could be attained through action. Moreover, paradoxically even successful action will (at least initially) undermine ontological security because it will necessarily change the very practices that provide cognitive stability. Added to this is that there is always a risk that action may be unsuccessful, which could lead to negative emotions such as shame and frustration and hence that it undermines ontological security rather than reinforce it. Moreover, if a change process is to be sustainable, the action undertaken must be perceived by the agents themselves as successful Ð meaning that the changed practices and resulting cognitive disturbance can be evaluated positively Ð which, given the paradox that agents prefer stability yet need self-esteem Ð is difficult to achieve. If agents evaluate their action positively and are able to cope with the ensuring cognitive inconsistency, a dynamic and expanding change process might be initiated. 113 Such action is Ôreinforcing actionÕ providing agents with positive emotions such as pride, enthusiasm and confidence, which is likely to produce a Ôcan doÕ attitude and willingness to initiate further action. However, action that is deemed unsuccessful and which fails to positively contribute to the on-going narrative and identity constructions and which is evaluated negatively by agents, is Ôundermining actionÕ which may produce negative emotions such as shame, frustration and uncertainty. Unsuccessful action will usually be terminated causing the change process to fizzle out, but in those cases where termination is not possible (for example a military intervention or a contractual relationship), a negative and undermining dynamic may be the result with severely detrimental consequences for ontological security. This is a risk that one must assume will always be part of agentsÕ calculations of whether or not to undertake changemaking action.
Given that undermining action can have severely detrimental effects on ontological security, it seems reasonable to assume that agents will be reluctant to undertake change-making action unless they are fairly certain of the action being rated as successful. The crucial question for agents seeking ontological security is therefore whether action is likely to be reinforcing or undermining. In day-to-day life, agents seeking ontological security will pursue the relatively safe option of simply engaging in practice that is 113 Neo-functionalists were always unequivocal in their assumption that spill-over Ð and hence change -was a reaction to disappointment and frustration. In the original version of neo-functionalism, spill-over was grounded in negative emotions such as the fear that political goals could not be achieved unless other areas of cooperation were incorporated into the process. in line with the agentsÕ narrative and identity and which will furnish them with cognitive stability.
Because such practice is habitual, it is unlikely to prompt agents to question the existing narrativeidentity nexus, but nor is it likely to provide them with any sense of pride or enthusiasm. The problem is that all negative influences from within the voluntaristic processes such as dysfunctional practices or undermining action and from external stochastic and deterministic factors are likely to block for the undertaking of new action. Moreover the number of stochastic factors, which might not be successfully incorporated into the on-going narrative and identity constructions are so plentiful that they are probably the norm rather than the exception.
The intricate relationship between identity, narrative, action and practice and the clear relationship between the two ontological security seeking strategies may well explain why change Ð especially sustainable change Ð seem so difficult to achieve. In the model illustrated in figure three, a positive and dynamic process of change is only likely when sustained reinforcing action is taking place (illustrated with the thick arrow from the Ôontological security bubbleÕ to the Ôaction bubbleÕ), and when both ontological security seeking strategies are successfully invoked, and only for as long as action remains reinforcing. In the absence of ontological security, agents have only limited surplus or inclination to undertake new action, but will concentrate on routinized practices, as they may contribute to an acceptable level of ontological security, but are unlikely to motivate action beyond maintaining the status quo. Given the infinite number of possible external influences to interrupt the search for ontological security, coupled with the certainty that changes in practice will lead to cognitive dissonance and the significant risk that agentsÕ own action may not be successful or may have negative unintended consequences, it is no wonder that sustained change processes are rare or that constructivist theory has struggled to understand why continuity seemed to trump change.
Conclusion
The article set out with the aim of addressing the dilemma of codetermination in constructivist theorizing about change by seeking to identify the motivations for agent-led change and to take a step in the direction of a more comprehensive constructivist understanding of why change appears to be difficult to explain for constructivists and difficult to undertake for agents. The article found that although arguably Ôconstructivism is all about changeÕ, constructivism has actually operated with a rather limited understanding of change, which in particular has not accounted for the emergent nature of change and has tended to focus either on the influence of structural factors or on change in identity or change in practice, but rarely on all three forms of change together. The introduction of ontological security as a key motivation for undertaking Ð or not undertaking Ð change making action has not only provided a deeper understanding of why agents only sometimes choose to put their agency to use, but has also offered a linkage between the different change processes and forms of change that constructivist theory has engaged with separately. In doing so, the framework that has been presented here is able to account for influences that are not normally considered when trying to explain one of the most enduring questions of International Relations Ð how to make change happen Ð especially how to change dysfunctional practices. Moreover, by focusing on deterministic and stochastic factors rather than the conventional agent-structure duality, the framework is able to incorporate all conceptions of structure -including material, social, ideational and discursive forms, and by introducing stochastic factors Ð it is able to theoretically account for all the Ôother stuffÕ, which clearly influence the ways in which we perceive ourselves and judge what constitute relevant action. This is important because as rather bluntly put by former US Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, Ôshit happensÕ, which inevitably impacts decisions and policy, but which is rarely addressed theoretically.
The focus on ontological security as a primary motivational factor for agentsÕ to use their agency strategically to alter the status quo, suggests that although human beings are endowed with agency and certainly appear to be more reflexive about their agency than is often acknowledged, their actual ability to utilize their agency is severely constrained by their need for maintaining ontological security. Once the scope of investigation is opened up to different forms of change and different processes of change and with a view of the social world as a trinity consisting of things that can be changed, things that canÕt and things that just happen, the interconnectedness of the different processes and the extent of agent-level reflexivity prior to engaging in action that might lead to change move into theoretical view.
For those with a normative agenda of Ômaking change happenÕ the new view of the field of change is certainly not a comforting one, because the model outlined in this article clearly shows the infinite number of possible obstacles standing in the way of sustained change.
Although the influence of the great variety of stochastic and deterministic factors certainly is important to take into account, the article has focused on the voluntaristic self-constitutive identification processes taking place at the agent level. The specific contribution here is that by focusing on these self-constitutive agent level processes and by introducing ontological security as a precondition for agency, the model does not rely on an essentialist conception of the self, but is fully aware of the complex processes invoked in the constitution of the self. Moreover, by combining several theoretical
